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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 16-2748 
________________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MIGUEL FIGUEROA, 
        
       Appellant 
 
     ________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-15-cr-00098-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 20, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  April 19, 2017) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 In September 2014, Newark, New Jersey Police Department officers patrolled a 
high crime area where they noticed Miguel Figueroa remove a black object from his lap 
and place it in his pocket.  When the officers announced their presence and asked 
Figueroa to stop, he fled.  The officers then chased and tackled him, whereupon they 
found a handgun in his pocket.  Before being read his Miranda rights, Figueroa told 
officers he had acquired the handgun to protect himself from the Latin Kings gang. 
At an evidentiary hearing, Figueroa moved to suppress the handgun and his post-
arrest statement.  Both he and the arresting officers testified as to the events leading to the 
arrest.  The District Court denied the motion to suppress, finding the officers’ testimony 
was credible and Figueroa’s account of the events inconsistent and unconvincing.  
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Figueroa was convicted for being a felon 
in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  He was sentenced to 65 
months’ imprisonment followed by a two-year period of supervised release. 
Figueroa challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress, 
contending the Court erred in deeming the officers credible and finding their stop of him 
to be legal.  On appeal, Figueroa’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel 
pursuant to Anders v. California because he believed the “case to be wholly frivolous. . .  
after a conscientious examination” of the possible grounds for appeal.  386 U.S. 738, 744 
(1967).  He properly provided the Court with the requisite “brief referring to anything in 
the record that might arguably support the appeal.”  Id.  Figueroa then filed a pro se brief 
challenging the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress on the above grounds.  
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Because he raises the same points on his own that counsel found to have no merit, we 
will address them directly and, in so doing, grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
Because credibility determinations are in the province of the fact finder, they are 
something of which we typically steer clear.  United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 
1078 (3d Cir. 1995).  Indeed, in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau we stated 
that the credibility determinations of a fact finder were “not subject to appellate review.”  
502 F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing United States v. Brown, 471 F.2d 297, 298 (3d 
Cir. 1972)).  This is so because those conclusions “may be influenced by factors such as a 
witness’ demeanor, his tone of voice and other matters not subject to appellate scrutiny.”  
Id. 
Figueroa argues the officers seemed suspicious and uncomfortable while 
testifying, and therefore the District Court’s determination that they were credible is 
incorrect.  However, the District Court noted the “impress[ive] . . . consistency and 
cogency of [the officer’s] accounts of the events” while also recognizing inconsistencies 
in Figueroa’s testimony.  United States v. Figueroa, 2015 WL 7756008, at *2 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 30, 2015).  In this context, the assessment of credibility here is not a thicket into 
which we enter. 
Similarly, Figueroa’s challenge to the legality of his Terry stop is unconvincing.  
Under Terry v. Ohio, officers may perform brief investigatory stops when reasonable 
suspicion is met.  392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).  Reasonable suspicion is analyzed by the totality 
of the circumstances and can include the defendant’s “location, a history of crime in the 
area, [defendant’s] nervous behavior and evasiveness, and [the officers’] commonsense 
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judgments and inferences about human behavior.”  Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 
206 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  The District Court 
correctly noted Terry stops have previously been found constitutional based on a 
defendant’s presence in a high crime area and flight upon seeing police – even without 
their noticing a gun on a defendant.  See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); 
United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir. 2006).  The District Court did not err 
in finding Figueroa’s stop valid because his presence in a high crime area, pocketing of 
what looked like a gun, and flight, aroused reasonable suspicion. 
As we will not disturb the credibility determinations as to the officers and 
Figueroa, and reasonable suspicion existed in this case, the stop of Figueroa was valid.  
Accordingly, we affirm and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.  
